Frederic Fekkai is regarded as a luxury brand in hair care: The success story of a French hairdresser living in the USA, and who became a “celebrity hair stylist”, materialized in a line of hair care products distributed through the selective network (Sephora, Nordstrom, Neiman Marcus, etc.). The brand was acquired by Procter & Gamble in early 2008 and now has 8 salons. It would be interesting to analyze two events that occurred in recent months:

• August 2009: Fekkai announced they are grouping together three of its “best sellers” under a single sub-brand. Brilliant Glossing, Salon Technician Colour Care and Full Blown Volume – which represent 40% of sales – are now sold under the brand name Fekkai Advanced. Change of packaging, new ingredients, new formulas, new textures: all of it is clearly repositioned more high-end with prices ranging between $ 20 and $ 23.
  
  

  The Director of the brand points out: “the Fekkai Advanced Subbrand helps differentiate it from any other collection and makes it more luxurious. You see a big departure from the old ranges“. The Fekkai Advanced distribution network is very selective: c. What was to become of the other Fekkai brand products?

• The answer was given in December.  The rest of the collection – which was the reason for the Fekkai success – has been renamed Fekkai Classic and will henceforth be sold in the mass-market networks at prices averaging $20: Target and Walgreens. Sephora’s response was immediate: they de-referenced Fekkai Classic.
  

These opposing reactions are very instructive. I would draw two lessons from it:

1. The exclusive beauty brands are now caught between Scylla and Charybdis: a sluggish exclusive market, and the exclusive/mass segmentation. Even in the United States where this distinction does not exist as far as regulations are concerned (as it does in Europe), it does exist in reality. How can business be developed when it is a beauty luxury brand in a flat market? Fekkai gives the answer: by branching into two, with a brand catering to the exclusive, and the other to the mass market. Fekkai expects to sell through 10 000 sales points within a year (i.e. 30% being mass-market sales)… so with a form of exclusive presence nonetheless.
2. The selection of sales outlets is of significance: Target is positioned “cheap chic”, which was a reason for its success and is fully consistent with the Fekkai positioning. Target could thus have supplied Fekkai with information from its database concerning its customers who already buy hair products at prices above $15. Walgreens is one of the leading drugstores – with a strategy for shifting towards high-end with its boutiques and advice (they have 21 000 beauty advisors) and a “customer-centric” strategy.

Contrary to analysts who predict that Fekkai will become commonplace, I think it is a move with great coherence: it adheres to customer expectations, it effectively helps to develop the brand, and it offers genuine legibility. Still, one may ask why the difference in price between the two collections is so small: We will probably see a slide towards $15 for the Classic product range.